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Abstract Auditing provides an essential security con-
trol in computer systems, by keeping track of all access
attempts, including both legitimate and illegal access
attempts. This phase can be useful to the context of
audits, where eventual misbehaving parties can be held
accountable. Blockchain technology can provide trusted
auditability required for access control systems. In this
paper, we propose a distributed Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC) system based on blockchain to provide
trusted auditing of access attempts. Besides auditabil-
ity, our system presents a level of transparency that
both access requestors and resource owners can benefit
from it. We present a system architecture with an im-
plementation based on Hyperledger Fabric, achieving
high efficiency and low computational overhead. The
proposed solution is validated through a use case of in-
dependent digital libraries. Detailed performance anal-
ysis of our implementation is presented, taking into ac-
count different consensus mechanisms and databases.
The experimental evaluation shows that our presented
system can process 5,000 access control requests with
the send rate of 200 per second and a latency of 0.3
seconds.
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1 Introduction
Access control systems exist to protect system resources
from unauthorized accesses. Based on the system poli-
cies, security procedures within the organization, and
the level of the sensitivity of the resources, the access
control systems follow one of the available access con-
trol models.
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [22,54] is
an access control model that regulates access permis-
sions, based on the characteristics (in this context called
attributes) of subjects, resources, and context (or en-
vironment). Access decisions are made by evaluating
these attributes based on defined policies. Fig. 1 shows
the overview of the ABAC model.
ABAC has some advantages over other access con-
trol models as, (a) it can provide fine-grained and flexi-
ble access control because it allows an arbitrary number
of attributes in access control decisions; (b) the imple-
mentation of complex policies is simple and applicable;
and (c) it can provide dynamic and effective access con-
trol decisions by involving environmental attributes in
decision making.
Auditing is one of the essential controls in systems
security. Auditing is the action of tracking all access
attempts, including both legitimate and illegal access
attempts. Keeping track of legitimate access attempts
helps with non-repudiation, and keeping track of illegal
access attempts helps with identifying potential threats.
Auditability is also one of the key characteristics of
blockchain by providing a trustable history of trace-
able transactions [7,6]. Blockchain can exploit smart
contracts to store access control policies, process ac-
cess decisions, store the result of access decisions, and
accountability regarding stakeholders with different in-
centives. Then, at any point in the future, all access
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Fig. 1 Attribute based access control.
attempts toward a particular resource can be queried
from the blockchain. This feature can be used as an au-
thentic proof for non-repudiation, or it can be studied
for further analysis to identify possible threats.
Besides, blockchain presents other beneficial features
that are desirable for access control systems such as
immutability and transparency. For example, if a mali-
cious system administrator changes a policy to grant or
deny someone access, it will be recorded on the blockchain,
and it is not possible to delete the trace of updates on
policies from the blockchain. For each policy, all history
of changes applied in the policy can be queried by per-
missioned users in permissioned blockchain. However,
we prevent such a problem by configuring smart con-
tracts so that authenticated parties must approve any
change in access control policies before execution.
In this study, we propose a complete end to end solu-
tion for implementing an ABAC system with the focus
on policy-based architecture based on Hyperledger Fab-
ric permissioned blockchain1. Our paper contributions
are summarized as follows:
– We propose an architecture for implementing a flex-
ible access control system based on ABAC and per-
missioned blockchain
– We discuss our access control components includ-
ing Policy Information Point (PIP), Policy Decision
Point (PDP), Policy Administration Point (PAP),
which are implemented as smart contracts (or Chain-
code)
– We provide a specific use case of digital libraries to
represent the system operation modelling.
– We carried out experiments, and we analyzed the
performance of the presented access control appli-
1 https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
cation using Hyperledger Caliper 2 based on multi-
ple configurations, including different databases and
consensus methods.
– Our performance analysis results also conduct a com-
prehensive comparison between various network con-
figurations and pluggable components in Hyperledger
Fabric modular architecture.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
The initial concepts of blockchain and access control
systems are presented in Section 2, followed by Sec-
tion 3, which reviews related studies. Section 4 explains
the system model, architecture and representation of
designed components. A case study based on access to
the digital libraries’ resources is introduced in Section 5.
Section 6 presents the evaluation results based on the
represented case study and multiple configurations. Fi-
nally, Section 7 concludes the paper and refers to our
future work.
2 Background
2.1 Blockchain and smart contracts
Blockchain is a particular type of distributed ledger
technology. The data is recorded on the blockchain as
a group of transactions called blocks. Each block has
a hash value, and it links to the previous block by ref-
erencing the hash value of the previous block in the
header of the current block. Consequently, data manip-
ulation is not possible in the blockchain, as even a slight
change leads to an inconsistency between linked blocks,
and can be recognized easily. In order to attach a valid
block to the blockchain, a consensus mechanism is ap-
plied. There are several consensus mechanisms with a
trade-off between performance and security.
Before the development of smart contracts, blockchain
applications were limited to creating cryptocurrencies
and simple monetary transactions. The development of
smart contracts has provided the infrastructure for cre-
ating more diverse blockchain-based applications. Smart
contracts are executable logic encoded in blockchain
with the ability to enforce automatically.
Blockchain networks can be divided into two main
categories: public and permissioned.
Public blockchains are open to the world, and ev-
ery user can join the blockchain with an anonymous
identity, submit a transaction, and participate in con-
sensus. Permissioned blockchains include an additional
membership layer, so only authenticated users can join
the blockchain and interact with different components.
2 https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/caliper
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Today many blockchain platforms exist, and they
are geared toward implementing smart contracts and
decentralized applications. They are different in dif-
ferent aspects, such as the type of the network(public
or permissioned), built-in cryptocurrency, transaction
workflow, performance, privacy, cost and, most impor-
tantly, maturity. Some blockchain platforms such as
Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric, Corda have mature tools,
while others have very little support for their users and
developers.
Hyperledger Fabric [4] is a famous implementation
of a permissioned blockchain, hosted by the Linux Foun-
dation. Hyperledger Fabric has a modular structure
that allows component pluggability, such as consensus,
membership, and database. The membership layer can
authenticate users and grant access to users based on
their access level and system policy. Hyperledger Fabric
has integrated the ABAC mechanism, so it is possible to
build permission groups for access control by checking
members’ attributes. However, access control parame-
ters and permission groups have to be predefined. It is
not suitable for applications that require dynamic and
flexible access control.
Our presented system provides a solution for off-
chain parties that look for a flexible and distributed
access control service compatible with their authenti-
cation service. Our provided solution can be easily in-
tegrated with any off-chain system, while access control
functionality is achieved through blockchain and smart
contracts.
Smart contracts correspond to logic encoded in the
blockchain that can be programmed and deployed as
an automation program. Accordingly, they can create
complex transactions and enforce their conditions au-
tomatically [45].
Chaincode is a term introduced by Hyperledger Fab-
ric for smart contracts. Chaincode may consist of multi-
ple smart contracts or include only one smart contract.
We use the chaincode and smart contract concepts in-
terchangeably.
Before the development of smart contracts, blockchain
applications were limited in creating cryptocurrencies
and simple monetary transactions. The development of
smart contracts provided the infrastructure for creat-
ing more diverse blockchain-based applications, such
as healthcare [26,5,11], Internet of Things (IoT) [25,
33], resource sharing [58,49], and business process man-
agement [51,28,41]. In our previous paper [44], we dis-
cussed that although the applications of these systems
are different, their primary purpose is similar as they
aim to control access over particular data. The domain
of the data is their main difference; for example, it could
be patient healthcare data or data generated by IoT de-
vices.
2.2 Access control models and ABAC
Access control refers to any action to prevent data and
resources from unauthorized access, disclosure or mod-
ification. In traditional databases, an authorization de-
fined by a triplet < o, s, p > and defines that subject s
is authorized to execute privilege p on object o [9].
Conventional access control models follow such def-
inition, adding into consideration the context in which
an access control request is performed.
(1) Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [10] or
authorization-based, (2) Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
[8] , and later (3) Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
[17] are three initial access control models [47].
DAC restricts access permissions based on the sub-
jects’ identity, and the resource owner defines policy
rules.
In MAC, the system defines access policies through
the security labels. This model usually is used for con-
trolling access over sensitive and confidential data.
In RBAC, there are predefined roles in the system
and users have different access levels depending on their
roles.
ABAC is logical access control that comprises ac-
cess control lists, role-based access control, and its own
method for providing access based on the evaluation
of attributes [22]. ABAC controls access to the system
resources by evaluating policies (system rules) against
entities’ attributes, including subject, object, and envi-
ronmental attributes. Attributes are characteristics of
the subjects (users) and protected objects (resources).
The environment conditions as the environment’s at-
tributes can also be taken into account for ABAC de-
cision making.
ABAC is a flexible and fine-grained mechanism that
is also capable of enforcing the other three methods.
Distributed systems also adopted ABAC as they re-
quire federation and autonomy control among coordi-
nated systems, and ABAC enables granular and meta
attribute capabilities that support privilege delegation
in a distributed application [23]. Likewise, blockchain-
based applications mostly adopt ABAC [44].
XACML [3] introduces a policy-based architecture
for the specification and enforcement of access control
policies. The architecture comprises the following com-
ponents.
– Client : the device that requests access to a resource,
possibly on behalf of a user.
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– Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): the network de-
vice on which access decisions are carried out. PEP
serves as the gatekeeper to the intended resource.
– Policy Information Point (PIP): the repository that
holds information (attributes) about the client and
provides this information to the PDP.
– Policy Decision Point (PDP): the component that
decides to allow or deny the client access to the re-
source.
– Policy Administration Point (PAP): the component
that is responsible for managing access control poli-
cies.
– Accounting or Auditing : The component that is re-
sponsible for tracking access attempts.
Figure 2 illustrates how these components interact
with the client and each other. A client requests ac-
cess permission, and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
forwards the request to Policy Decision Point (PDP).
Policy Decision Point (PDP) queries the related policy
and attributes from Policy Administration Point (PAP)
and Policy Information Point (PIP). After receiving the
required information, Policy Decision Point (PDP) as-
sesses the access decision and sends the result to Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) for enforcing the access de-
cision.
Fig. 2 ABAC logical components based on Policy based ar-
chitecture [3]
3 Related Work
Many studies on blockchain technology focus on pre-
senting an access control system either in the context
of specific applications, such as healthcare [55,43,5,52,
11,42], IoT [34,57,14,39,35,13,30], and cloud federa-
tion [16,2] or they introduce a general access control
system, which can be employed for different applica-
tions. In our previous study [44], we have investigated
the state of the art of access control systems based on
blockchain. In this section, we overview similar studies,
which present an attribute-based access control based
on blockchain. As illustrated in table Section 3, many
studies use the attributed-based method for their ac-
cess control system because of the granularity, flexibil-
ity, and dynamic features that ABAC provides.
Guo et al. in [19] introduce a hybrid architecture
for access control over Electronic Health Record (EHR)
data using blockchain and edge nodes. The blockchain
acts as a tamper-proof validation component to verify
identities and access control policies. The edge nodes
store the EHR data off-chain and enforce the access
controls. The smart contracts include the address of
EHR data on the edge nodes by using one-time self-
destructing URLs 3. Based on performance results against
unauthorized retrieval for the average transaction pro-
cessing time was 40 ms, and the average response time
was 30 ms. Also, the test result based on a high num-
ber of patients does not affect the response time and
indicate the scalability of their solution.
Zyskind et al. in [60] conceptualizes the blockchain
technology as an access control moderator, complemented
by an off-blockchain storage solution. Blockchain clients
representing users that provide their data to a service
provider are the owners of their data. Based on that
premise, this solution is meant to empower users, so
they have the information about which data is col-
lected about them by third parties and how their data
is used. For achieving that goal, each data owner can
issue transactions, used to change the set of permis-
sions granted to a service or entity. Each transaction
is recorded on the blockchain, allowing for auditability
and traceability.
Zhang et al. in [57] propose a solution directed to
IoT blockchain-based access control. The authors in-
troduce the concepts of Judge Contract (JC), Register
Contract (RC) and Access Control Contracts (ACC).
Access control contracts store access control policies
for a subject-object pair. In this system, both JC and
RC are essential pieces in regards to achieving a dis-
tributed and reliable access control. The JC receives
misbehaviour reports and applies penalties according
to them. The RC stores the misbehaviour information
from the JC and manages it through the judging method.
Moreover, it stores information such as name, subject,
object, and smart contract for access control.
Zhu et al. in [59] propose a transaction based access
control (TBAC) system that integrates ABAC model
into the bitcoin blockchain. There are four implemented
transactions, including subject registration, object es-
crowing and publication, access request and grant. They
also present a cryptosystem associated with their sys-
tem as an additional security layer. The system is eval-
3 https://1ty.me/
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Table 1 A summary of blockchain-based access control applications.
Research paper Domain Access control method Privacy Support Scalability
Jemel and Serhrouchni [24] Data sharing ABAC + Attribute-based Encryption X x
Wang et al. [50] Data sharing ABAC + Attribute-based Encryption X x
Zhu et al. [59] Resource sharing ABAC X x
Hu et al. [21] Knowledge sharing Fine-grained x x
Ferdous et al. [16] Cloud federation - x x
Alansari et al. [2] Cloud federation ABAC X x
Zhang and Posland [55] Health care ABAC X x
Rouhani et al. [43] Health care Role-based X X
Guo et al. [19] Health care ABAC x X
Asaph et al. [5] Health care - X X
Xia et al. [52] Health care - X x
Dagher et al. [11] Health care Role-based X X
Rajput et al. [42] Health care Role-based X X
Zyskind et al. [60] Mobile applications Policy-based X X
Novo [34] IoT - x X
Outchakoucht et al. [36] IoT Policy-based x x
Zhang et al. [57] IoT Policy-based and dynamic access control x x
Dukkipati et al. [14] IoT ABAC X x
Pinno et al. [40] IoT ABAC X X
Ouaddah et al. [35] IoT - X X
Ding et al. [13] IoT ABAC x X
Ma et al. [30] IoT Generic X X
Rouhani et al. [46] Physical access control Role-based x X
Es-Samaali et al. [15] Big data management ABAC X X
Xh et al. [53] Space situation awareness Capability-Based x X
Lyu et al. [29] Information centric networking matching-based X x
Paillisse et al. [37] Multi-administrative domain - X x
Laurent et al. [32] General access control Access Control List X x
Maesa et al. [12] General access control ABAC x X
Guo et al. [20] General access control ABAC X x
Lee et al. [27] General access control Role-based X x
uated in terms of security, but the performance and
scalability of the system are not examined.
In the federated cloud services, access control en-
forcement is still vulnerable to privacy violations.
Alansari et al. in [2] present an attribute-based ac-
cess control system based on Pedersen commitment
scheme [38] and blockchain. The system is designed to
keep the users’ attributes private from the federated or-
ganization. Users’ identity attributes and access control
policies are stored on the blockchain to guarantee the
integrity of them. They also employed Trusted hard-
ware technology to guarantee the integrity of the policy
enforcement process.
Zhang and Posland in [55] propose an architecture
for granular access authorization that supports flexible
queries, which provides secure authorization at different
levels of granularity. The designed architecture offers a
capable infrastructure without requiring the public key
infrastructure (PKI), so it decreases the computation
time needed and suitable for the devices with limited
resources in EMR systems. As a result, their system
can efficiently respond to a requester without exposing
unauthorized private data.
Maesa et al. in [12] implemented an access control
service on top of Ethereum 4. Blockchain is used to
4 www.ethereum.org
store smart contracts that represent access control poli-
cies represented in eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) [3] and to perform the decision
process. Such smart contracts are called Smart Pol-
icys (SPs). Thus, SPs are responsible for the policy
evaluation process, embedding a PDP for a specific ac-
cess control policy. Each time, an access request needs
to be evaluated to make an access decision, and the
blockchain executes it in a distributed way. The decision
is made based on information concerning the users. For
this purpose, the concept of Attribute Manager (AM) is
introduced. AMs are the components that manage the
attributes of the entities involved in the process, such
as subjects, resources, and environmental context. AMs
can update and retrieve their values and are created by
an entity, the Attribute Provider (AP). Implementation
based on Ethereum blockchain is costly since, for every
operation, a fee called gas must be paid. Although for
public blockchain systems, it is generally unavoidable,
for permissioned implementation, this is an unnecessary
additional cost imposed on the system.
The privacy and security of the data generated by
IoT devices are the major concern of the IoT system
due to the extensive scale and distributed nature of IoT
networks. In order to protect users’ privacy, many stud-
ies have considered blockchain to provide secure access
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control to the IoT data. References [14,40,13] presented
an ABAC for IoT systems. Dukkipati et al. solutions
[14] store system policies off-chain while [40] stores the
polices on the Ethereum platform and is less vulnerable
to security breaches, but more costly. Ding et al. in [13]
focus on simplifying the access control protocol to make
it lightweight and suitable for IoT devices with limited
computing capability and energy resources.
Fig. 3 Blockchain-based access control service architec-
ture [31].
Zhang and Posland in [56] present an architec-
ture for a blockchain-based Electronic Medical Record
(EMR) access with granularity control that supports
flexible data queries. The user layer first sends a query
that could have different levels of granularity, such as
block query, attribute query, or mixed query. The agent
layer aggregates the query data and authorizes the user,
who has access permission for that query. If it is a valid
query, it passes the query to the storage layer. The stor-
age layer returns the data to the agent layer. The agent
layer encrypts the query and sends it to the user layer.
Lastly, the query is decrypted, using the provided access
keys. The represented architecture provides a flexible
infrastructure to achieve granular access control with-
out requiring Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), so it
leads to a decrease in computation time proceeding.
As we reviewed, many studies have investigated
blockchain as a back-end infrastructure for the dis-
tributed access control system. However, most of the
prior works in this area are domain-specific. It means
their access control solutions are designed for a par-
ticular domain, such as healthcare data or IoT data.
Besides, most of these studies lack the details of im-
plementation and performance analysis. As a result, it
remains unclear if a blockchain can be the basis for ac-
cess management at large scale.
4 System Model and Architecture
Centralized access control systems suffer from various
problems such as: (a) the risk of privacy leakage, and
(b) the risk of a single point of failure; (c) interoperabil-
ity issues; (d) unreliability of the access control system,
and (e) the presence of third parties.
An access control system can utilize the blockchain
technology to address these problems. The decentral-
ized nature of the blockchain resolves the problem of a
single point of failure. Cryptographic methods ensure
the reliability of the ledger. Consensus mechanisms en-
sure that the state of the ledger is valid, and it is the
same for every participant. Smart contracts allow mon-
itoring and enforcement of sophisticated access control
decisions. Also, with automatic enforcement, they can
address privacy issues.
This solution empowers both resource owners and
subjects (typically access requesters). Details of each
granted or revoked access permission can be queried
from the ledger, including the policies that have been
applied, the attribute values and the time of access
request. In practice, under no circumstances, resource
owners do not deny access to a resource by a right-
ful requester. On the other hand, the resource owners
leverage provided audit trails, while being assured that
no user had subverted the system.
To provide a solution to these problems, we used
the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain. In the blockchain,
there have to be at least two endorsing nodes belonging
to different organizations. These nodes are responsible
for executing SPs. Clients would be the systems that
use this system, as depicted in Fig. 4.
The workflow of the users remains unaltered. The
only difference is that the authorization requests are
now mediated through one or more nodes representing
the given system, as the evaluation of access control
policies could be not trusted for the subject of the re-
quest, who instead requests invalid access to resources.
In order to protect the privacy of users’ data, Hy-
perledger Fabric provides a private data feature to pro-
tect sensitive users’ data. We have used this feature
to represent the attributes that are required for ac-
cess permissions based on the organizations’ defined
policies. The private data is hashed, and then it will
be endorsed and ordered like other data. Finally, the
chaincode writes hashed data on the ledgers of every
peer. However, only organizations that require these
private attributes to give access permission have ac-
cess to them. Using Zero-knowledge proofs Zero knowl-
edge proofs (ZKP)[18] is another alternative that can be
applied for highly privacy-preserving case studies that
require to protect all users’ attributes from all access
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Fig. 4 High level system architecture using the Archimate
modeling language [48].
providers and data owners. However, ZKP requires ad-
ditional time and computational resources compared to
our solution based on Hyperledger Fabric private data
feature.
In our solution, as depicted in Figure 5, the
blockchain acts as a mediator between the entity that
requests access to a specific resource and the entity that
manages that resource. The system includes two main
components. The first component is an off-chain sys-
tem that relies on permissioned blockchain to store its
access control attributes on it and query access permis-
sions from it. The second component is a permissioned
blockchain that manages different access control com-
ponents through smart contracts and stores the data
on a tamper-proof ledger.
The three main smart contracts are PIP contract,
PAP smart contract and the PDP contract. Subject
(users) and resource (objects) attributes are stored
in a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data format
through the PIP contract. The PIP is also responsi-
ble for checking write conflicts and updating attributes.
Policies are also recorded in the system as JSON data
format, and PAP contract is responsible for managing
policies and updating policies. The system could be im-
plemented to work with multiple PAPrun by different
organizations. Even if there is only one PAP, the trans-
parency offered by this solution distributes the trust
and the responsibility of these access policies. PDP con-
tract evaluates policies to make an access decision. Fig-
ure 6 shows the architecture of the implemented smart
contracts.
After smart contracts evaluate SPs against their re-
spective attributes, the PDP returns its decision to the
PEP. This process allows a decoupling between users
and the blockchain administration (as users do not need
to have a node on the blockchain, which is desirable).
Our solution not only logs all access requests in a
very secure way but also provides a framework to con-
trol all access controls concerning the participants in
the network. Nodes from the private network can access
the blockchain, check transactions’ history, and audit
the history of access requests and results. Automatic
auditing techniques can be developed by analyzing the
history of access request transactions. A fine-grained
access control solution is provided that enforces access
validation through blockchain-based service providers.
5 Case Study
A digital library is a collection of documents in an orga-
nized electronic form that allows users to access them
online. A highly dynamic user population and the nu-
merous collection of resources in digital libraries require
a fine-grained and dynamic access control method such
as ABAC [1]. It requires that access policies specified
based on users’ attributes and characteristics rather
than users’ roles in the system.
In this section, we have selected a case study for ac-
cess control in digital libraries to illustrate and explain
the application of our ABAC system.
For every subject, we store it with a subject ID
(SID), and the set of its attributes and values, and
the same for Objects attributes. Attribute ID is a re-
quired field to store attributes in the Hypeledger Fabric
database and later retrieve the respective attribute for
permission decision. Both Hyperledger Fabric support-
ing databases (CouchDB and Level DB) are key-value
stores, and the ID field is used as keys.
SnA is the set of attributes associated with the
subjectn and SnID defined as a key for storing the
correlated attributes. Similarly, OnA is the set off at-
tributes associated with the objectn and OnID defined
as a key for storing the correlated attributes.
PnSA and PnOA are the sets of subjects and Ob-
jects determinative attributes in the policy of n. Same
as attributes, Policy ID (PnID) is a required field to
store attributes. For every policy, we store the determi-
native attributes (PnSA,PnOA) along with the policy’s
rules.
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Fig. 5 Blockchain Access Control System Architecture.
Fig. 6 Smart contracts architecture
SnA = {SnID, {{SnA1, value}, ..., {SnAn, value}}}
OnA = {OnID, {{OnA1, value}, ..., {OnAn, value}}}
Defining SA as the set of all subjects attributes and
OA as the set of all objects attributes, we have:
SA = (S1A ∪ S2A ∪ ...SnA)
OA = (O1A ∪O2A ∪ ...OnA)
PnSA ⊆ SA
PnOA ⊆ OA
PnSA,PnOA ∈ P
Pn = {PnID, PnSA,PnOA, rules}
Resulting, we have the following attributes for the
subject S1A and object O1A:
S1A = {“s001”, {“status”, true}, {“expiration”, “2020−
05− 12”}, {“libraryGroup”, 12}}
O1A = {“r001”, {“libraryGroup”, 12}}
The policy P1 with the id “policy01” is as following:
P1 = {“policy01”, S1A,O1A, {“status == true” ∧
“expiration” > “1Day” ∧ “user.libraryGroup” ==
“resource.libraryGroup”}}
5.1 JSON Data Format
In our implemented solution, the access control data
(attributes and policies) is followed by the JSON for-
mat. Using JSON, as a widespread data format, can
be used by a broad range of applications. An example
of a sample policy, including subject (user) attributes,
and object (resource) attributes, is illustrated in the fol-
lowing JSON code snippet. Based on the presented pol-
icy, the subject and the resource attributes, our subject
has valid access permission to the resource, as the sub-
ject has valid Identifier (ID), active status, non-expired
membership and the subject library group matches with
the resource library group. If one of the subject’s at-
tributes does not pass the policy rules, the access per-
mission will be denied.
Example: Definition of a sample Access Control Policy, Sub-
ject and Resource followed by the JSON format
p o l i c y = {
‘ ‘ pol icyID ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ p o l i c y 01 ’ ’ ,
a t t r i b u t e s : {
‘ ‘ user ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ s tatus ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ Active ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ exp i ra t i on ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ Date o f exp i ra t i on ’ ’ ,
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‘ ‘ l ibraryGroup ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ Group ID ’ ’
} ,
‘ ‘ r e source ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ l ibraryGroup ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ Group ID ’ ’
}
} ,
‘ ‘ r u l e s ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ u se r . s tatus ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ comparison type ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ boolean ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ comparison ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ boolAnd ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ value ’ ’ : t rue
} ,
‘ ‘ u se r . exp i ra t i on ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ comparison type ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ datetime ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ comparison ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ isMoreRecentThan ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ value ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ 1DAY’ ’
} ,
‘ ‘ u se r . l ibraryGroup ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ compar i son target ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ l ibraryGroup ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ comparison type ’ ’ ‘ ‘ numeric ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ comparison ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ i s S t r i c t l y E q u a l ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ f i e l d ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ r e s ou r c e . l ibraryGroup ’ ’
}
}
}
}
}
s ub j e c t = {
subject ID : ‘ ‘ s 001 ’ ’ ,
a t t r i b u t e s : {
‘ ‘ s tatus ’ ’ : t rue ,
‘ ‘ exp i ra t i on ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ 2020−05−12 ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ l ibraryGroup ’ ’ : 12
}
}
r e s ou r c e = {
resourceID : ‘ ‘ r 001 ’ ’ ,
At t r ibut e s : {
‘ ‘ l ibraryGroup ’ ’ : 12
}
}
6 System evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the proposed system per-
formance. We used Hyperledger Caliper to measure the
performance of our system based on our own written
benchmark and various configurations.
6.1 Environment configuration, performance
parameters, and assumptions
We evaluate every component of our system against two
different databases, Couchdb and Goleveldb and two
orderer services, Raft and Kafka. We also present the
results of the evaluation based on the Solo orderer to
illustrate the effect of other parameters separated from
the effect of the involved consensus method.
Raft is a crash fault-tolerant (CFT) ordering service
based on the implementation of Raft protocol. Raft fol-
lows the “leader and follower” model. The leader makes
decisions, and the followers follow the leader. The peer
that represents the leader is changed frequently. Every
follower has the chance to be a candidate to become the
leader of the next round.
Similar to Raft, Kafka is a CFT ordering service,
which follows the “leader and follower” model as well.
However, Kafka uses ZooKeeper 5 to manage clusters.
Zookeeper keeps track of the status of the Kafka cluster
nodes and partitions.
Solo is a single ordering node, and it is not fault-
tolerant. It is meant to be used for testing purposes.
We used the Google Cloud Platform to run a Virtual
Machine (VM) instance and test our application and
collect performance analysis data. The machine type is
n2-highcpu-8, which includes eight virtual CPUs and 8
GB of memory. All the tests are run on the same virtual
machine, as Caliper emulates workload distribution be-
tween several clients.
The default number of blockchain clients is 10 (each
client emulated by a different NodeJS6 process), the
default number of transactions is 5,000, and the default
transaction type is policy decision transaction, which
queries the related data from ledger based on access
request and determines the result of the access request.
The default database for Raft and Kafka is GoLevelDB.
The default number of organizations is two, and the
default number of peers is one.
6.2 Performance evaluation results
Figure 7 shows the average latency (in seconds) for
three different transactions, Record attributes, PDP,
and query data from the ledger based on Kafka orderer.
In every round of the test, we configured the test with
a different number of transactions. Although the aver-
age latency increases with the number of transactions,
the increase is not sharp, and it increases very slowly.
As the graph illustrates, the system can process 10,000
access decisions with an average latency of 0.54 seconds.
Figure 8 shows the average latency (in seconds) for
the same three different transactions, based on the Raft
orderer. The test result is based on a different number
of transactions. Similarly, the average latency increases
with the increase in the number of transactions. The
test run has failed for the Raft orderer with 10,000
transactions due to VM Memory limitation. The re-
source consumption result indicates that Raft memory
5 https://zookeeper.apache.org/
6 https://nodejs.org/en/
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Fig. 7 Average latency of Kafka as a function of the type of
transactions.
Fig. 8 Average latency of Raft under different transactions.
consumption increases 4.33 times, in comparison with
Kafka. This fact explains why the test failed in the mid-
dle of executing 10,000 transactions with the Raft or-
derer.
For both Raft and Kafka orderers, increasing the
number of transactions increases the average latency for
the record attributes transaction. Policy decision trans-
action has the minimum average latency for both Kafka
and Raft, based on 3,000 transactions. For Record at-
tribute and query data transactions, the average la-
tency in Raft is slightly higher than Kafka. For the
policy decision transaction, the average latency in Raft
for 1,000 and 3,000 transactions is slightly lower than
Kafka, but for 5,000 transactions, the result is the op-
posite.
Figures 9 and 10 show the average latency and
throughput for the policy decision transaction for Raft
and Kafka based on different send rates. The number of
transactions for these two tests is 5,000. The dendrite
of 200 transactions per second (tps) is an optimal point
for Kafka as it exhibits the lowest average latency, and
Fig. 9 Average latency of Raft and Kafka based on different
transactions.
Fig. 10 Throughput of Raft and Kafka under different trans-
actions.
the average latency increases sharply after the send rate
of 200 tps.
The maximum throughput for both Raft and Kafka
orderers is at the send rate point of 300 tps; after-
wards, the throughput drops for both of them. Overall,
in terms of throughput and average latency, Raft per-
formed better than Kafka when the throughput passed
200 tps as a turning point for Kafka.
Figure 11 shows the effect of increasing the number
of organizations and peers and the comparison of two
different databases, GoLevelDB and CouchDB. Increas-
ing the number of organizations and peers increases
the average latency for all three transactions. For the
CouchDB database with three organizations and two
peers, the average latency increases sharply to 43.81
seconds for the policy decision transaction, which is
17.73 times more than GolevelDB and 64.42 times more
than the same database, with two organizations and one
peer. It shows that CouchDB performs inadequately in
comparison with GoLevelDB.
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Table 2 Resource consumption for Raft and Kafka.
Orderer Name Memory(max) Memory(avg) CPU(max) CPU(avg) Traffic In Traffic Out Disc Read Disc Write
Raft dev-peer0.org1 74.4MB 71.MB 32.25% 28.21% 13.8MB 5.3MB 0B 0B
dev-peer0.org2 73.3MB 69.7MB 33.23% 28.28% 13.8MB 5.3MB 0B 0B
peer0.org1 379.3MB 369.4MB 67.21% 56.32% 31.1MB 23.7MB 0B 21.8MB
peer0.org2 284.0MB 274,1MB 70.78% 55.66% 31.1MB 23.6MB 4.0KM 21.8MB
orderer1 554.1MB 535.4MB 26.11% 15.41% 22.4MB 59.1MB 0B 37.2MB
orderer2 525.3MB 506.5MB 18.78% 11.88% 27.6MB 28.7MB 0B 37.0MB
orderer0 513.3MB 494.7MB 19.40% 11.63% 27.5MB 10.6MB 0B 37.2MB
Kafka dev-peer0.org1 73.5MB 72.8MB 17.87% 15.26% 7.5MB 2.5MB 0B 0B
dev-peer0.org2 64.5MB 62.8MB 18.73% 15.69% 7.5MB 2.5MB 0B 0B
peer0.org1 295.9MB 286.2MB 52.08% 49.15% 27.1MB 17.0MB 368.0KB 21.2MB
peer0.org2 294.1MB 282.7MB 51.54% 48.38% 27.1MB 17.1MB 152.0KB 21.2MB
orderer0 121.1MB 113.1MB 25.80% 23.30% 29.6MB 11.1MB 4.0KB 18.4MB
orderer1 124.1MB 115.2MB 21.87% 20.25% 29.7MB 46.5MB 276.0KB 18.4MB
Fig. 11 Throughput of Raft and Kafka under different trans-
actions. Legend: xOnP = x Organizations and n Peers; gdb
= GoLevelDB; cdb = CouchDB.
Fig. 12 Average latency based of Raft and Kafka with dif-
ferent number of clients.
Figure 12 shows the average latency for both Raft
and Kafka based on the different number of clients. This
test is run based on 5,000 transactions and the policy
decision transaction. For Kafka, 25 number of clients
is like an optimal point that has the lowest average la-
tency (0.3 seconds). However, 25 is an optimal point
for the system with current resources. For Raft, as the
graph shows, there are two points for the minimum
average latency, corresponding to 20 and 25 number
of clients. In general, Kafka performs better under 25
clients, but after 25 clients, it shows a sharp increase in
the average latency. Although it shows that the system
is not scalable after 25 clients, it significantly depends
on the computation power and limitations of the VM
instance. We have repeated the test with a more pow-
erful VM instance, and average latency was 0.36 second
for Raft and 0.31 second for Kafka with 60 clients.
Table 2 presents the resource consumption for pol-
icy decision transactions based on 5000 transactions for
Kafka and Raft. As the presented numbers in the table
demonstrate, Raft consumes 4.33 times more memory
on average in comparison with Kafka. It clarifies that
our early test with 10,000 transactions with Raft or-
dered failed because the VM ran out of memory.
7 Conclusion
Dependable accountability mechanisms are essential for
audits. In this paper, we discussed how permissioned
blockchains could be helpful as a trustable backend in
access control systems, thus providing a solid basis for
audits. We proposed a distributed ABAC system based
on Hyperledger Fabric with a focus on auditability and
scalability. We validated our solution through a decen-
tralized access control management application in dig-
ital libraries. First, we presented a comprehensive re-
view of studies focusing on blockchain-based access con-
trol studies. Then we presented the system architecture
and implementation details, where the PDP, PAP, and
AM components have been implemented using smart
contracts on-chain, and the PEP was implemented off-
chain - based on the blockchain clients’ requirements.
The experimental evaluation of our solution con-
sidered various parameters based on the Hyperledger
Caliper framework in terms of system performance. The
evaluation results indicate that our system can effec-
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tively handle 10,000 access request transactions with
an average latency of 0.54 seconds.
Future work is in progress in two directions: first,
building a robust framework and platform-independent
solution towards distributed access control; second, in-
tegrating user authentication to our authorization so-
lution.
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